The Little Incident That Started the Peloponnesian War ~ The Imaginative Conservative

The Peloponnesian War is an example of how a small crisis can spiral out of control and eventually develop into a full-blown war if not handled properly.

The Peloponnesian War (431–404 BC) was actually the second war fought between Athens and Sparta in the fifth century. Why did hostilities break out again openly? The Greek general and historian Thucydides' reflections on this question in his History of the Peloponnesian War is one of the greatest books of all time. Thucydides's investigation not only examines the causes of this second war between Athens and Sparta, which led to the end of the Athenian Empire, but he does so in a way that allows us to understand the possible causes of all wars in human history. In short, every age has good reasons to revisit Thucydides.

Thucydides contains so many profound analyses of human character and political action that no short treatise of his writings can do him justice. However, I would like to focus briefly on a key example that shows how a crisis, if not handled properly, can spiral out of control and eventually lead to full-blown war. In the case of the Peloponnesian War, Thucydides devotes particular attention to describing the Epidamnus affair.

Although Epidamnus (far north, on the west coast of Greece) was a daughter colony of Korkyra (modern-day Corfu), the mother colony of Korkyra nevertheless pursued a relatively isolationist foreign policy. When the democrats seized power in Epidamnus, the exiled oligarchs allied themselves with some foreign powers and fought back. But Korkyra saw no reason to interfere. Korkyra refused to help.

It was only when the desperate democrats besieged at Epidamnus turned to the Corinthians that the real drama began. Corcyra was itself a Corinthian colony, and so Epidamnus' appeal to Corinth was like a daughter who now goes straight to her grandmother when her mother will not give her what she wants. In the case of Corinth and Corcyra, there had been enmity between them for centuries, as they frequently went to war against each other and fought over colonies that each claimed for itself.

In the current situation, Epidamnus tried to take advantage of this rivalry by offering to declare itself a colony not of Corcyra but of Corinth, in exchange for aid from Corinth. Corinth's power and prestige were in decline, while Corcyra's isolationism had led to an astonishing growth of its fleet, so that Corcyra now had 120 ships. In other words, Corcyra's fleet was only second to the Athenian fleet. The mother had surpassed the grandmother with a clearly visible success, embodied in this powerful fleet. Therefore, the grandmother was more than happy to accept this request, which increased her pride and honor more than anything else. The Corinthians accepted Epidamnus' invitation: the daughter would now say that the grandmother was her true mother. Corinth would send troops and settlers and adopt Epidamnus as her own child.

Thucydides describes the emotional motivation behind the Corinthians’ willingness to attract geopolitical attention by accepting the invitation from Epidamnus:

The Corinthians agreed. They believed that the colony belonged to them as much as to the Corcyraeans, and felt it a kind of duty to undertake its protection. Moreover, they hated the Corcyraeans for their contempt for the mother country. Instead of receiving the usual honours accorded to the mother city by any other colony in public assemblies, such as precedence in sacrifices, Corinth was treated with contempt by a power which in wealth rivalled even the richest communities in Hellas, which had great military strength, and which could not sometimes suppress its pride in the high naval position of an island whose nautical fame dated from the days of its ancient inhabitants, the Phaeacians. This was one of the reasons for the care they devoted to their fleet, which became very efficient; in fact, they began the war with a force of one hundred and twenty galleys (I.25.3–4, Loeb translation).

Thucydides helps to reveal an important dimension of political dynamics and motivations beyond purely rational calculation. The Corinthians did not think of a grand strategy beyond themselves and took the stability of the Greek world for granted. Maintaining peace between Athens and Sparta after their first war was not the most important thing for the Corinthians. The tiny colony of Epidamnus, in the middle of nowhere, was not associated with any actions of universal significance. Instead, the most important thing for the Corinthians was an opportunity to indulge in what seemed to be primarily emotional gratification.

But the impetuous decision-making was quickly reciprocated. Korkyra flexed his muscles and decided to send a fleet to Epidamnus. Since the sea voyage was emotional, there was no strategy for negotiation. The larger fleet simply tried to issue ultimatums backed up by the threat of force.

Stop for a moment and consider not only how quickly the situation escalated, but also for what reasons. Korkyra's interests were not threatened by the new takeover of Corinth. A loss of power or prestige would have resulted. The proof of this lies in Korkyra's foreign policy before the Corinthians took action. Korkyra had happily stayed out of the civil war in Epidamnus. But now they were committed to a course from which they would find it difficult to back down without losing face. Nevertheless, Korkyra sent forty ships to Epidamnus to help the exiled oligarchs and their allies retake the city from the democrats.

But Korkyra was wrong in her assessment of the grandmother's iron resolve and how much fighting spirit she still had in her despite her vastly inferior fleet. Corinth, burning with passion, had decided to do whatever was necessary. She would rebuild her naval power to regain her supposed former greatness.

In addition, Corinth had greater influence among the Greeks, even if its navy was smaller than that of Corcyra. Corinth did not back down and used its diplomatic network to bring new settlers from all corners of Greece to Epidamnus, the newly declared colony of Corinth. In addition, it vigorously recruited ships and money from its allies to fight back against Corcyra.

At this point, Corcyra realized that an unforeseen crisis point had been reached and sought a diplomatic solution. But it is precisely at this point that we must ask, together with Thucydides, what the grand strategy of the great powers Athens and Sparta should have been to keep the peace. Why did their grand strategy fail, as it finally did in 431? Because after the battles of Leucum (435) and Sybota (433) with Corcyra, the burning hatred of Corinth towards Athens because of the Epidamnus affair was, among other reasons, a key factor that drove the great powers to war.

Corcyra responded to Corinthian determination by implicitly threatening to form a naval alliance with Athens. This thinly veiled threat was, to those with the strategic mind to recognize it, actually a much greater threat to the stability of the Greek world. An alliance between the fleets of Corcyra and Athens would have been an unacceptable existential threat to Sparta's own military supremacy, upon which the status quo in its post-war treaty with the Athenians rested.

The recklessness of the Corcyraean threat to ally with Athens is that it motivated Corinth to go to war rather than not to. Moreover, when Corinth lost at Leucine, it did not want to go away with less ambition and hatred, or a lesser sense of honor. On the contrary, it burned even more. This battle at Leucine was not a solution to the crisis, but only an aggravation of it, in the face of Corinth's implacable determination to take revenge. Thus, with Thucydides, we have occasion again and again to turn our attention to the battle of Sybota in retrospect. We can ask, what could have been done differently?

To deal with the crisis, Athens sent only ten ships to the battle that once again pitted Corcyra against Corinth. It was a symbolic gesture of moderation, a gesture that benefited Sparta above all. Even when Athens, reconsidering Pericles' moderation, sent another twenty ships, they arrived too late for the battle to lead to anything other than the stalemate that followed.

But a nagging question should concern us: What if Athens had crushed Corinth at Sybota instead of engaging in a seemingly moderate attempt at deterrence? Subsequent events would show that Corinth could not in fact be deterred. How can a grand strategy take such incorrigible actors into account and still maintain peace?

One possible outcome could have been a Corinthian victory, with Corinth capturing the Corcyra fleet. A Corinthian victory over Corcyra would have been as destabilizing for the Greek world as an Athenian victory over Corinth. Therefore, the only choice seemed to be a victory for one of the three rival fleets: Corcyra, Corinth, or Athens.

Given precisely this dynamic and the uncomfortable situation of a triple rivalry, it seemed that the Athenians needed not only a deterrence plan to maintain peace, but also a comprehensive strategy for defeating the greatest threat to peace.

This essay was first published here in July 2016.

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