A blessing for religious freedom in Japan?

The government of Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida has been pushing ahead with the dissolution of the Family Federation/Unification Church (UC) in Japan, but the first result has been its own dissolution. At a press conference on August 14, Kishida announced that he would step down as head of Japan's ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) in September. But whether his resignation will stop measures that have a chilling effect on religious freedom in Japan is an open question.

Outrage against the Family Federation and repressive measures against unpopular religious groups in general escalated after the assassination of former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe on July 8, 2022. The assassin told investigators that he shot Abe to take revenge for his support of the UC and that he harbored a grudge against the church because of his mother's donations more than twenty years ago.

Japanese media subsequently uncovered links between the UC and the LDP.

The Kishida administration responded harshly. On August 31, 2022, the LDP declared that it would no longer have relations with the UC and its affiliated organizations. On October 16, Kishida announced that the government would launch an investigation into the Family Federation, and three days later it overturned a precedent by declaring that civil lawsuits, not criminal violations, could serve as grounds for dissolution. On October 13, 2023, the Kishida administration filed a petition with the Tokyo District Court to dissolve the Family Federation.

The Kishida government did not just target the family unit. Related laws carried a more general anti-religious tone. In December 2022, Japan's parliament passed a law to prevent unfair corporate fundraising, which gave broad refund rights to those who claimed to be victims of “mind control,” as well as relatives and others who refuse donations on the grounds of mind control.

The Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare subsequently issued new guidelines on “religious abuse of children.” Written in consultation with the Japan Society for the Prevention and Rehabilitation of Cults (JSCPR), the guidelines had the immediate effect of creating a climate of discrimination and hatred against Jehovah's Witnesses, who reported a 638% increase in hate crimes in 2023 compared to the previous six years.

This caught the attention of four UN special rapporteurs, who sent an official letter to the Japanese government expressing concern about the “stigmatization of some religious or ideological minorities,” a situation they considered warranting “immediate action.”

However, concerns from the international human rights community did not lead to Kishida's resignation. Japanese people were largely unhappy with his handling of the financial scandals within the LDP. Essentially, he took a cancel culture approach, firing ministers and dissolving party factions rather than dealing with the underlying problems. This was similar to his approach to “socially problematic” groups such as the Family Federation and Jehovah's Witnesses. In the end, he himself resigned.

The question remains whether Kishida's resignation will improve the situation. This will depend to some extent on his successor. However, negative “cult” stereotypes and systemic obstacles to religious freedom in Japan should not be underestimated.

Japanese religion expert Levi McLaughlin points to a distinction in Japanese culture: “good religion,” which is rooted in Japanese “culture, custom, spirituality, tradition, or other secure tradition,” and “deviant sects, misleading superstitions, nefarious cults, and other heterodoxy.” These minority groups are responsible for what he describes as Japan's “discomfort with religion,” and periodically trigger “moral panics.”

Conformist tendencies that characterize Japan's judiciary and media reinforce social prejudice. Critics of Japan's judicial system have highlighted its reticence over the actions of the executive and legislative branches, its lack of transparency (Japan does not use juries and trials are private), and a culture of presumption of guilt in which prosecutors win 99.9% of criminal cases and 98% of appeals. This has implications for the family dissolution case brought by the Kishida government.

Japan ranks lowest among the G-7 countries in terms of press freedom. A major reason for this is the restrictive, government-sanctioned “Kisha Kurabu,” or press clubs. When the government distances itself from an unpopular group or labels it a social evil, reporters limit themselves to one-sided, negative stories. “Near-universal censorship” has led to a “press disaster” and an “information disaster” for the family unit in Japan, according to one report.