Growing threat of terrorist prison breaks in West Africa

Growing threat of terrorist prison breaks in West Africa

The pattern of attacks on prisons shows that the insurgents are determined to free their members from prison.

Published on 03 September 2024 in ISS Today

From

Samuel

Researcher, ISS Regional Office for West Africa, the Sahel and Lake Chad Basin

The attack on the well-fortified Koutoukale prison in Niger's Tillabéri region on July 11 followed two failed attempts in 2016 and 2019. In this year's incident, an unknown number of inmates escaped from the prison, which holds Islamist militants, among others.

No group publicly claimed responsibility for the recent prison break, but sources in northeast Nigeria reported that ISS today that there were ongoing talks between the Islamic State of West Africa (ISWAP) and Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) about the return of ISWAP members released in the attack. This suggests that JNIM, which operates in the Sahel region, may be responsible for the attack.

This latest incident comes two years after a similar ISWAP attack in Abuja, Nigeria – the Kuje prison break on July 5, 2022. In March this year, the Nigerian House of Representatives held a hearing on the whereabouts of escapees from that attack, which resulted in the release of 879 prisoners, including 68 Boko Haram members. About 544 are still at large.

Following the Kuje prison break, the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) reported that a Boko Haram prisoner who had a mobile phone had been communicating with members of the group outside. Ongoing ISS research into the Boko Haram conflict and the group's leadership structures suggests that the prisoner who escaped in the prison break is now the head of ISWAP's Timbuktu province in the Lake Chad Basin.

The prison breaks give prisoners the assurance that the insurgents, especially ISWAP, will not abandon their members.

At the House of Representatives hearing in March, a Nigerian army official reportedly said that two problems contributed to the prison break's success – and that the army had repeatedly pointed them out to prison authorities – were the low perimeter fence and the lack of video surveillance.

But a higher fence would not have prevented the prison break, as the attackers used explosives to knock down part of the fence. When the break-in began, the army had just withdrawn its soldiers from Kuje Prison as part of their rotation. The break-in lasted for more than an hour without reinforcement from the security forces, and the perpetrators and prisoners were able to escape quickly.

It is also doubtful whether the surveillance cameras could have prevented the incident. To be useful, the surveillance cameras would have required the undivided attention of security and intelligence personnel. Taking all these factors into account, it is unlikely that the attack would have succeeded without help from within, not least from the prisoners.

Among those who have left ISWAP, ISS spoke to some who participated in Boko Haram's first prison break in Bauchi State in 2010, which saw the release of over 100 members. They said the group spent months gathering intelligence by stationing dozens of local young men and boys around the prison, police stations, the Emir's palace and the market. They went underground by doing various businesses, which gave them a perfect cover.

Cross-border cooperation can help prevent prison breaks and track down escaped prisoners through the exchange of information

The late Boko Haram leader, Abubakar Shekau – who was holed up in Kano at the time, receiving treatment for gunshot wounds from the 2009 internal uprising that led to the death of group founder Mohammed Yusuf – gave each youth 40,000 naira (then US$263) to set up these businesses.

Due to a lack of intelligence in the Kuje incident, measures such as video surveillance and high walls would have been unlikely to prevent the attack. A few weeks later, the Speaker of Nigeria's House of Representatives revealed that the State Security Service had received 44 reports of the attack before it took place. Previously, failure to act on similar intelligence led to the deadly attack on the Abuja-Kaduna train, which was attacked by a joint gang of Boko Haram and bandits in northwest Nigeria.

While ISWAP claimed responsibility for the Kuje incident, it assured its members in other detention centers that it would work for their release. Three months later, the organization attempted a similar attack on a military facility in north-central Nigeria where senior members of the group were being held, but soldiers were able to thwart the attack.

The targeted attacks on detention centres in Niger and Nigeria and the recent transport of escaped Kuje by ISWAP reassure inmates in these countries and elsewhere that the insurgents, especially ISWAP, will not abandon their members.

Ongoing talks between ISWAP and JNIM could also lead to refugees being brought across borders

The implications extend beyond the Chad Basin and the Sahel. In East and Central Africa, violent extremist groups may be inspired by the successes of their West African counterparts. This requires better intelligence and improved security in facilities where terror suspects are held.

Cross-border cooperation is also needed, as violent extremism can no longer be treated as a purely national problem. This includes sharing best practices on preventing prison breaks and intelligence on tracking escaped prisoners. Boko Haram has demonstrated its ability to use cross-border links to transport supplies or fighters, including the escapees from Kuje prison who arrived in the Lake Chad islands via Niger. If successful, ongoing talks between ISWAP and JNIM could also lead to attempts to move escapees across borders.

Relations between Niger and Nigeria are strained following seven months of sanctions imposed by the Economic Community of West African States against Niger and the formation of the Sahel Alliance by Niger, Mali and Burkina Faso. However, these countries must find a way to work together to combat terrorism, including the threat of prison escapes.

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