London Fire Brigade ‘ignored warnings of Grenfell high-rise fire’

The report found that the fire at Lakanal House in Camberwell, south London, was a “precursor” to the Grenfell Tower fire in 2017.

It concluded that despite the lessons learned from the July 2009 fire in which six people died, the LFB had failed to “respond effectively”.

The report identified several important actions that the LFB should have implemented following this incident.

This included making better use of its knowledge of the hazards posed by modern materials and construction methods and regularly training its control center staff to handle many simultaneous fire calls.

“The tragic conclusion is that the fire at Lakanal House in July 2009 had alerted the LFB to the deficiencies that were revealed again on the night of June 14, 2017,” the report said.

“These deficiencies could have been avoided if the LFB had been managed more effectively in many respects, particularly in its response to the Lakanal House fire, and if its knowledge of the hazards posed by modern materials and construction methods had been used.

“Whatever way you look at it, this is a serious indictment of an organization whose primary purpose is to protect the public and of the quality of its leadership.”

The report places the blame on the LFB's senior management, pointing out that this failure has many causes, including a “chronic lack of effective leadership” combined with an “excessive emphasis on process and a culture of complacency.”

It attributed “ultimate responsibility for the LFB’s inability to take effective action following the Lakanal house fire” to former LFB commissioners Roy Dobson and Dany Cotton.

During the first phase of the inquiry, Ms Cotton said she would not change her team's response on the night of the Grenfell Tower fire.

Ms Cotton, the LFB's first female commissioner, later resigned in December 2019 after the service's response was met with criticism.

The report also looked at the “stay put” strategy used during the Grenfell Tower fire.

The final report of the Grenfell inquiry states that the strategy is only acceptable “if the risk of fire entering and spreading through the external wall is negligible”.

Calculating the risk of fire spreading and the time required for evacuation is the responsibility of a qualified fire protection engineer, the report said.

In light of its findings, the report contained a number of recommendations regarding the LFB.

This includes the establishment of a fire and rescue academy to train firefighters, equipping firefighters with digital radios and training them in how to properly deal with communication problems.

The report also recommended that His Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire and Rescue Services carry out inspections of the training of LFB operational commanders, their operational planning, their arrangements for implementing change and their use of control rooms.

The Fire Brigades Union (FBU) called on the government to go beyond its recommendations.

Secretary General Matt Wrack said the deregulation of the past decades must be “comprehensively reversed”.

He added: “The systems for ensuring building safety must be transferred to public ownership and must be provided with the necessary resources.”

The London Fire Brigade said it was now “better prepared” to respond to high-rise fires, but did not want to “rest on its laurels”.

Commissioner Andy Roe said the brigade had accepted all the recommendations in the first phase report and had since implemented “significant changes”.

These changes include new equipment, improved training and better capabilities for responding to fires in high-rise residential buildings.